U.S. v. Reese — criminal — reversal — Ambro
“This is one of the rare cases in which the Speedy Trial Act … requires that we vacate a conviction and remand for dismissal of the indictment,” begins today’s first opinion. And “rare” is both true and ironic, because today’s other opinion, issued by a different panel, does the same thing.
Here, with less than three weeks left on the defendant’s Speedy Trial Act clock, the district court continued the trial sua sponte for another two-and-a half months. The Third Circuit held that dismissal was required but left it to the district court to decide first whether re-prosecution would be allowed.
In a concurrence that, unusually, lists two judges as co-authors, Judges Ambro and Greenaway criticized five other circuits’ rulings that defendants can waive Speedy Trial Act claims by failing to seek dismissal on that basis in district court. The concurrence observed that waiver was not an issue here because the government had not raised it its brief or in oral argument.
Joining Ambro were Chagares and Greenaway. Arguing counsel were Jacob Schuman of the EDPA federal defender for the defendant and Michelle Olshefski of the MDPA U.S. Attorney’s office for the government.
U.S. v. Williams — criminal — reversal — Restrepo
The Third Circuit reversed on Speedy Trial Act grounds here, too, but in this case the panel directed the district court to dismiss with prejudice, precluding re-prosecution. The court joined three circuits in splitting with the Second Circuit and holding that “periods of unreasonable delay of more than ten days in the transport of a defendant to the site of a psychological examination conducted in the course of a proceeding to determine a defendant’s mental competency are non-excludable” for Speedy Trial Act purposes.
Joining Restrepo were Chagares (who sat on both panels) and Hardiman. Arguing counsel were Omodare Jupiter of the DVI federal defender for the defendant and Everard Potter of the DVI U.S. Attorney’s office for the government.
Close Third Circuit followers will note that today’s opinions were posted earlier than normal. The Court’s consistent practice is to post the day’s precedential opinions on its website around 12:35 (with rare late-afternoon postings, too), a couple hours after counsel receive them through ECF, but I stumbled upon today’s opinions around 10:30. I assume this earlier posting was a blip rather than a change in procedure, but we’ll see.