This is a guest post by David Goodwin.
In re. Various and Sundry § 2244(b) Applications—§924(c)(3) residual clause—granting—Greenaway
In United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague, the latest in a line of decisions invalidating “crime of violence” residual clauses. Decided while these applications to file second or successive § 2255 motions were pending, Davis essentially answered the question posed by each; while the government continued to oppose aspects of some individual applications, Judge Greenaway’s short opinion for the court observes that they all involve merits inquiries and can be addressed by the relevant District Courts.
(I know of at least one person whose head will explode at the references to § 2255 motions as habeas petitions…)
Joining Judge Greenaway were Judge Ambro and Judge Chagares. Arguing were Arianna Freeman for the applicants and former Cowen clerk Steve Sanders (back in the appeals division!) for the government.
Mammana v. BOP—prison conditions/8th amendment—vacating—Fuentes
Former federal prisoner Anthony Mammana alleged that, while in disciplinary segregation, he was placed for four days in the ominously named “Yellow Room”: a chilled room with constant lighting, no toilet paper, no bedding and an extremely thin mattress, and only paper-like clothing. He claimed that these conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment. The District Court dismissed, deeming these conditions “uncomfortable,” but not unconstitutional.
Writing for the Court, Judge Fuentes vacates and remands under the standard of Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); although since Mammana had pleaded that the defendants were aware of what was happening, the “sole issue” on appeal was whether the deprivation was sufficiently serious. Although individual conditions may not themselves amount to a deprivation, “mutually enforcing” conditions can add up to a deprivation. Here, Mammana had adequately alleged individual deficiencies that added up to a plausible deprivation of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” such as warmth and sufficient sleep. His Eighth Amendment claim should have been allowed to proceed.
A curiosity: according to the opinion, the Magistrate Judge recommended that this part of Mammana’s complaint (I think?) be allowed to go forward. While Mammana lodged objections, the government did not. Nevertheless, the District Court appears to have reviewed the Report and Recommendation de novo anyway, knocking out the “only claim currently surviving.” (In the Third Circuit, the District Court’s decision to review de novo despite a failure to object can set up a blank slate for appeal, which appears to have happened here.)
Joining Judge Fuentes were Judge Shwartz and Judge Krause. The case was decided without oral argument. Matthew B. Weisberg of Weisberg Law and Gary Schafkopf of Schafkopf & Burgess are listed as Mammana’s counsel. AUSA D. Brian Simpson represented the government defendants.
Golden v. NJIT—attorney fees—reversing—C.J. Smith
The plaintiffs in this case submitted records requests to the New Jersey Institute of Technology (“NJIT”) under a state law authorizing them to do so. (The law in question gets abbreviated as “OPRA,” which I will not use because it conjures the fanciful mental image of Ms. Winfrey personally ordering the disclosure of public records and having opinions about fees.) Some of the requests implicated documents originating with the FBI, which refused to allow their disclosure. But once litigation began, however, the FBI and NJIT reversed course and produced many additional records. “A-ha!” crowed the plaintiffs. “This New Jersey state law is a fee-shifting statute, and so we can now go after you for attorney’s fees, you fools!” But the District Court shook its head. “Not so fast, you Pulitzer-winning putzes. The defendants acted reasonably and no nexus existed between your lawsuit and the disclosure. No fees!”
Writing for the Court, Chief Judge Smith frowns upon this conclusion. Under the “catalyst” theory, which the NJ Supreme Court follows, plaintiffs can recover if there’s a “factual causal nexus” between the litigation and the relief ultimately received (even if not actually ordered by the court) if the relief had a “basis in law.” Here, there was a causal nexus, and NJIT’s reliance on the FBI’s directives does not change its status as the relevant custodian. With regard to reasonableness, Judge Smith does not think the relied-upon NJ Supreme Court decision supports NJIT’s position; “the ‘reasonableness’ language in [the decision] refers to the reasonableness of an agency’s efforts to comply with a document request before a lawsuit is filed—not whether the proffered basis for denying access is reasonable.” Thus, the plaintiffs were entitled to fees, and the Circuit remands back to the District Court to decide dollars and cents.
There’s a bunch of fascinating stuff going on here, including a threshold jurisdictional holding about federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1), which comes up far less often than you’d expect. The FBI removed the case to federal court as a third party, but did so in a “facially inadequate” notice that failed to enumerate the required conditions for removal. Chief Judge Smith concludes that all four are, in fact, satisfied; the most interesting factor, in my view, is a proposed federal defense that the relevant records were not subject to the state law of disclosure (rathe than, say, FOIA). Also, in footnote 13, the Court appears to join the Fifth and Eighth Circuits (among others, possibly; it’s a see, e.g. cite) to hold that third-party defendants can remove under the federal officer statute.
Joining the Chief were Judge Chagares and Judge Greenaway.
Katie Townsend of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press argued for the appellants, and Gary Potters of Potters & Della Pietra is listed as counsel for the appellees; I guess the FBI wasn’t actually participating despite appearing on the caption (it didn’t have to pay).