Weber v. McGrogan—civil—dismissal—Matey
A woman filed a pro se lawsuit in federal court arising from “her experiences dealing with New Jersey public officials during a child custody matter.” When she filed it, the custody dispute was still being litigated in state court. The district court dismissed her suit on Rooker-Feldman or Younger-abstention grounds, but its dismissal was without prejudice. The pro se plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, was notified by the court the ruling wasn’t final, asked the district court to issue a final ruling, and then agreed to dismiss her appeal. The defendants then asked the district court to dismiss with prejudice because she hadn’t amended, and response, the district court entered a docket entry stating that the case was terminated and citing the prior dismissal with prejudice.
So, was either (1) the docket entry terminating the case, or (2) the earlier order dismissing with prejudice as appealable final order? Today, the court answered this “surprisingly elusive” question in the negative. The docket entry wasn’t a final order because it was a “utility event” instead of a text order. The earlier dismissal wasn’t appealable either, despite prior Third Circuit cases allowing appeals by litigants choosing to stand on their complaint without securing a dismissal with prejudice because the pro se woman’s intent to stand on her complaint here wasn’t clear enough. So the court concluded that the woman still has a live action in district court and that she is free to appeal, again, after the district court enters a final order.
Starting in the introduction and continuing throughout the opinion, Judge Matey employs an epic-journey theme. For example, the opinion opens with a quote from Ulysses and then observes that finality is required for appellate jurisdiction because “an epic poem of problems often follows when charting any other course.” The recitation of the procedural history notes at one point, “And that is where the story begins its journey into mystery.” This style of writing has not been common in the Third Circuit, and it will be interesting to see whether Judge Matey, uh, continues down this path.
Joining Matey were Jordan and Bibas. Arguing counsel were Christopher Zirpoli of Covington & Burling as court-appointed amicus for the plaintiff and Michael Sarno of the NJ office of the attorney general for the state. The court thanked court-appointed counsel for his “able assistance.”
Sorry, dear reader, but when the court issues five opinions (!) in one day, and you go on for four paragraphs about the first one, and you’re actually a busy lawyer not a blogger, then the other four cases don’t get their due.
U.S. v. Aviles—criminal—reversal—Rendell
The Third Circuit today vacated a defendant’s sentence because it held that at least two of the prior convictions upon which the sentence was based did not qualify as felony drug offenses under 21 USC § 841.
Joining Rendell were McKee and Roth. Arguing counsel were MDPA AUSA Stephen Cerutti II for the government and MDPA AFPD, and former Fisher clerk, Quin Sorenson for the defendant.
North Sound Capital v. Merck—civil—reversal—Krause
The introduction:
In these consolidated appeals, we consider whether the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) prohibits investors from bringing individual actions under state law if they exercise their constitutionally protected right to opt out of a class action. Hewing to SLUSA’s text, we conclude that these opt-out suits and the class actions from which these plaintiffs excluded themselves were not “joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed[ing] as a single action for any purpose.” 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)(II). Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s dismissal of these suits and remand for further proceedings.
Joining Krause was Bibas; Shwartz dissented, arguing that the opt-out actions functioned as a single action with the class action and thus were properly dismissed. Arguing counsel were Daniel Hume for the appellants and Daniel Kramer for the appellees.
Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Del.—civil / qui tam—affirmance—Porter
The Third Circuit today ruled that district courts are not statutorily required to hold an in-person hearing before dismissing a complaint under the False Claims Act and Delaware’s state-law analog.
Joining Porter were McKee and Rendell. Arguing counsel were Michael Confusione of Hegge & Confusione for the appellant and Dylan Steinberg for the government.
In re: Hackler—bankruptcy—affirmance—Roth
The Third Circuit held that a real-estate-title transfer under New Jersey’s tax foreclosure procedures may be voided under section 547(b) of the bankruptcy code.
Joining Roth were McKee and Porter. Arguing counsel were Elliott Almanza of Goldenberg, Mackler for the appellant and Leonard Walczyk of Wasserman, Jurista & Stolz for the appellee.