Park v. AG — immigration — dismissal — Fuentes
South Korean citizen Sang Goo Park entered the US on a visitor’s visa, and the visa stated that he had been employed at an electronics company when in truth he was a cook. The discrepancy came to light some years later when Park filed an approved petition from his employer to adjust his status. In what seems like an insane misallocation of government resources, the government decided to deport him over this, and years upon years of litigation ensued.
The issue in today’s appeal is crisply summarized in the opinion’s introduction (cite omitted):
He now claims that, in the years since the removal order, he has become eligible for a “§ 212(i)” waiver of inadmissibility. He would like the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) to reopen his removal proceedings so that he might apply for the waiver, but he faces an imposing obstacle. Because of the passage of time, his only route to reopening lies through 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), commonly known as the “sua sponte” reopening provision. Under that regulation, the BIA may reopen a case at any time. The BIA has held, however, that it will do so only in extraordinary circumstances. As a result, the BIA’s discretion in this area is broad—so broad, in fact, that we have no meaningful way to review it, thereby depriving us of jurisdiction over orders denying sua sponte reopening.
Park’s petition invokes one of the limited exceptions to the rule against review. He argues, as he did before the agency, that the BIA has consistently reopened sua sponte for aliens like him who have become eligible for relief from removal after their cases have ended. By ruling consistently in this way, Park contends, the BIA has established a rule or “settled course of adjudication” that it is now bound to follow, or at least from which the BIA may not depart without explaining itself. Park also points to our two precedential opinions interpreting this “settled course” exception, Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen. and Cruz v. Att’y Gen., as weighing in favor of our ability to review the BIA’s decision.
Park’s petition gives us an opportunity to clarify our jurisprudence surrounding the “settled course” exception, which originated over a decade ago but has existed since without a framework. In part, this requires us to interpret Chehazeh and Cruz, which Park reads as being broader than they actually are (a mistake he is not alone in making).
The opinion noted that Third Circuit non-precedential opinons have applied the settled course exception inconsistently, sometimes suggesting that a bare allegation was enough to confer appellate jurisdiction. The court rejected that approach, holding that a petitioner seeking to invoke the exception must establish that the BIA limited its discretion through a settled course, and explaining that this showing must be such that the BIA’s ruling “can be meaningfully reviewed” and “must be persuasive enough to allow the reasonable inference that the BIA’s discretion has in fact been limited.” Applying this framework, the court held that Park’s showing failed and dismissed his petition.
Joining Fuentes were Ambro and Shwartz. Surprisingly, the case was decided without oral argument; petitioner’s counsel was David Kim of New York.