United States v. Grant — criminal / sentencing — reversal in part — Greenaway

In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama that mandatory sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders violate the Eighth Amendment, Today, in a major juvenile-sentencing decision, the Third Circuit extended Miller to hold that a 65-year sentence for homicide crimes committed at age 16 was unconstitutional. From the introduction:

This case presents several difficult challenges for this Court. It calls upon us to decide a novel issue of constitutional law: whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits a term-of-years sentence for the duration of a juvenile homicide offender’s life expectancy (i.e., “de facto LWOP”) when the defendant’s “crimes reflect transient immaturity [and not] . . . irreparable corruption.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016). Next, if we find that it does, then we must decide what framework will properly effectuate the Supreme Court’s determination that the Eighth Amendment affords nonincorrigible juvenile offenders a right to a meaningful opportunity for release. Furthermore, we must take great pains throughout our discussion to account for the substantive distinction that the Supreme Court has made between incorrigible and non-incorrigible juvenile offenders in order to ensure that the latter is not subjected to “a punishment that the law cannot impose upon [them].” Id. (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)).

Our decision today therefore represents an incremental step in the constitutional discourse over the unique protections that the Eighth Amendment affords to juvenile homicide offenders.

The court held, ” A term-of-years sentence without parole that meets or exceeds the life expectancy of a juvenile offender who is still capable of reform,” which the court held includes all non-homicide offenders, “is inherently disproportionate and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment under both Miller and Graham.” The court joined the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, and split with the Eighth, on the applicablity of Miller and Graham to de facto life sentences.

Joining Greenaway were Cowen in part and Padova EDPA by designation. Judge Cowen dissented in part, joining the Eighth Amendment holding in full but disagreeing with the majority’s denial of sentencing relief as to additional counts based on the sentencing-package doctrine.

Arguing counsel were Lawrence Lustberg of Gibbons for the appellant and Bruce Keller for the government.

Moreno v. AG — immigration — affirmance — Vanaskie

Today, the Third Circuit held that a Pennsylvania conviction for possessing child pornography, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6312(d), is a crime involving moral turpitude supporting removal. The petitioner was a 49-year-old man who lived legally in the U.S. since age 12, pled guilty to a single count, and was sentenced to probation.

Applying the categorical approach (the opinion in a footnote echoed concerns raised about the categorical approach in other recent Third Circuit opinions), the court held that the least culpable conduct under the statute — consensual ‘sexting’ between an 18 year-old and a 17 year-old — is morally turpitudinous. But the opinion seemed to base that conclusion on little more than the fact that such conduct is criminal, which strikes me as questionable. Lots of conduct is subject to prosecution without being “inherently base, vile, or depraved.” Does anyone really believe that sexting between two consenting teenagers is depraved?

Joining Vanaskie were Shwartz and Fuentes. Arguing counsel were Wayne Sachs of Philadelphia for the petitioner and Jaclyn Shea for the government.