Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc — civil — partial reversal — Krause
Oh, what a story. (The facts are taken from the opinion.)
A guy borrowed $1000 from a lender, offering his car as collateral. The interest rate on this loan was 250 percent. The lender wired the money into the guy’s account, and then the lender started withdrawing $208 each month. After two months the guy took the money out of the account because he didn’t realize it was the lender making those withdrawals. The next month, when the lender couldn’t withdraw the third payment, it promptly contracted to repossess the guy’s car. Then — the lender having already collected $415 in monthly installments and $50 as a transfer fee — the repossessor told the guy that to get his car back — this is just a few months after the guy took out the $1000 loan — he had to sign a release, pay a $250 repossession fee, and pay $2143 to satisfy the loan.
Which he did. Then he sued, under RICO, the FDCPA, and state law. Eye poppingly, the district court granted summary judgment, on all claims, against the guy.
Today, the Third Circuit affirmed as to one claim — upholding denial of the FDCPA claim because the defendants had a right to possess the car even if the underlying loan was illegally usurious — but reversed on everything else. The court emphatically rejected the district court’s view that RICO’s prohibition against collecting unlawful debt did not apply to seizing collateral. And the court reversed the summary judgment on the state law claims after offering this withering observation:
The District Court granted summary judgment against Goldenstein on his PFCEUA and UCC claims without addressing the substance of the PFCEUA claim, without even mentioning the UCC claim, and despite the fact that Appellees did not argue those claims in their motion for summary judgment.
S.B. v. KIndercare Learning — civil — jurisdictional dismissal — Sloviter
After a child was allegedly injured at a daycare center, her mother sued in state court. The daycare removed the case to federal court. The plaintiffs retained a new lawyer, who sought to voluntarily dismiss without prejudice because the child (age 4) was too young to explain her injury. The district court granted dismissal but ordered the plaintiffs to pay the daycare’s attorney fees and refile within 4 years (extendable for good cause). The plaintiffs appealed. and today the Third Circuit held that the voluntary dismissal without prejudice here was not an appealable final order. The court left open the possibility that a litigant could appeal the attorney fees once their amount had been set, and that a litigant could appeal the conditions in an appeal from a later dismissal with prejudice for failing to comply.
Joining Sloviter were Smith and Hardiman. The case was decided without argument.