Workman v. Superintendent — habeas corpus — reversal — Fuentes
The Third Circuit today ruled in favor of a habeas corpus petitioner, holding that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing almost entirely to mount a defense and that post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness excused default of that issue under Martinez v. Ryan. Notably, the court held that the petitioner did not need to prove prejudice from his counsel’s error because, under United States v. Cronic, prejudice was presumed due to counsel’s near-total failure to contest the prosecution’s case.
[Disclosure: I provided minor consulting assistance to counsel for the petitioner.]
Joining Fuentes were Ambro and Restrepo. Arguing counsel were Marshall Dayan of the WDPA defender for the petitioner and Catherine Kiefer of the Philadelphia DA’s office for the Commonwealth.
US v. Renteria — criminal — affirmance — Fuentes
The Third Circuit today split with the Second Circuit in holding that venue for a conspiracy conviction does not require proof that it was reasonably foreseeable that conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy would occur in the venue district, affirming a defendant’s conviction and sentence.
[Disclosure: I assisted counsel for the defendant by being a judge for her oral argument moot.]
Joining Fuentes were Greenaway and Rendell. Arguing counsel were Susan Lin of Kairys Rudovsky for the defendant and Bernadette McKeon of the EDPA U.S. Attorney’s office for the government.
Trinity Industries v. Greenlease Holding Co. — civil — partial reversal — Jordan
One company built railcars at a particular site for over 75 years, then another company bought the site and built railcars there for another 14 years. A state investigation of the site revealed illegal waste dumping on the site, resulting in a criminal prosecution and almost $9 million in clean-up costs. The two companies disputed how the clean-up costs should be allocated between them under CERCLA and an analogous state law. The district court allocated 62% of the clean-up cost to the first company; today, the Third Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the district court’s allocation methodology was speculative because it materially deviated from the second company’s expert’s allocation methodology.