Tag Archives: Concurrences and other non-dissenting separate opinions

New opinions — two Third Circuit rulings recognizing limits on religious-based discrimination

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia — civil — affirmance — Ambro

Catholic Social Services sued the City of Philadelphia because it wanted to continue to receive foster referrals from the city but it refused to comply with the city’s general anti-discrimination requirements because it refused to work with same-sex couples wanting to be foster parents. The Catholic foster agency claimed that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech clauses required the city to renew its contract with them despite the group’s unwillingness to comply with the city’s anti-discrimination laws. The district court ruled that Catholic Social Services was not entitled to a preliminary injunction, and today the Third Circuit affirmed, holding, “It has failed to make a persuasive showing that the City targeted it for its religious beliefs, or is motivated by ill will against its religion, rather than sincere opposition to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.”

The heart of the opinion:

CSS’s theme devolves to this: the City is targeting CSS because it discriminates against same-sex couples; CSS is discriminating against same-sex couples because of its religious beliefs; therefore the City is targeting CSS for its religious beliefs. But this syllogism is as flawed as it is dangerous. It runs directly counter to the premise of Smith that, while religious belief is always protected, religiously motivated conduct enjoys no special protections or exemption from general, neutrally applied legal requirements. That CSS’s conduct springs from sincerely held and strongly felt religious beliefs does not imply that the City’s desire to regulate that conduct springs from antipathy to those beliefs. If all comment on religiously motivated conduct by those enforcing neutral, generally applicable laws against discrimination is construed as ill will against the religious belief itself, then Smith is a dead letter, and the nation’s civil rights laws might be as well.

The Catholic foster agency’s discrimination first came to light in this news story last year by Julia Terruso in the Philadelphia Inquirer.

[Disclosure: I assisted counsel for intervor-appellees by serving as an argument-moot judge.]

Joining Ambro were Scirica and Rendell. Arguing counsel were Lori Windham of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty for Catholic Social Services, Jane Lovitch Istvan for the city, and Leslie Cooper of the ACLU for intervenor-appellees.

 

Curto v. A Country Place Condominium Assoc. — civil  — reversal — Ambro

A condominium community with a large Orthodox Jewish population had a swimming pool. To accommodate Orthodox principles, it aside over 60 hours a week for mens-only or women’s only swimming, leaving only 25 hours a week for mixed-gender swimming. Condo residents sued, alleging that the gender-segregation of the pool violated the Fair Housing Act. The district court ruled in favor of the condo, but today the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the pool segregation violates the FHA because it reserves most of the after-work hours to men.

Joining Ambro were Bibas and Fuentes. Fuentes also concurred to express skepticism that merely allocating the evening hours more evenly would save the condo’s sex-segregation policy. Arguing counsel were Sandra Park of ACLU for the plaintiffs and Angela Maione Costigan of Costigan & Costigan for the condominium association.

New opinions — two Speedy Trial Act reversals (!)

U.S. v. Reese — criminal — reversal — Ambro

“This is one of the rare cases in which the Speedy Trial Act … requires that we vacate a conviction and remand for dismissal of the indictment,” begins today’s first opinion.  And “rare” is both true and ironic, because today’s other opinion, issued by a different panel, does the same thing.

Here, with less than three weeks left on the defendant’s Speedy Trial Act clock, the district court continued the trial sua sponte for another two-and-a half months. The Third Circuit held that dismissal was required but left it to the district court to decide first whether re-prosecution would be allowed.

In a concurrence that, unusually, lists two judges as co-authors, Judges Ambro and Greenaway criticized five other circuits’ rulings that defendants can waive Speedy Trial Act claims by failing to seek dismissal on that basis in district court. The concurrence observed that waiver was not an issue here because the government had not raised it its brief or in oral argument.

Joining Ambro were Chagares and Greenaway. Arguing counsel were Jacob Schuman of the EDPA federal defender for the defendant and Michelle Olshefski of the MDPA U.S. Attorney’s office for the government.

 

U.S. v. Williams — criminal — reversal — Restrepo

The Third Circuit reversed on Speedy Trial Act grounds here, too, but in this case the panel directed the district court to dismiss with prejudice, precluding re-prosecution. The court joined three circuits in splitting with the Second Circuit and holding that “periods of unreasonable delay of more than ten days in the transport of a defendant to the site of a psychological examination conducted in the course of a proceeding to determine a defendant’s mental competency are non-excludable” for Speedy Trial Act purposes.

Joining Restrepo were Chagares (who sat on both panels) and Hardiman. Arguing counsel were Omodare Jupiter of the DVI federal defender for the defendant and Everard Potter of the DVI U.S. Attorney’s office for the government.

 

Close Third Circuit followers will note that today’s opinions were posted earlier than normal. The Court’s consistent practice is to post the day’s precedential opinions on its website around 12:35 (with rare late-afternoon postings, too), a couple hours after counsel receive them through ECF, but I stumbled upon today’s opinions around 10:30. I assume this earlier posting was a blip rather than a change in procedure, but we’ll see.

New opinion — Third Circuit strikes down Delaware’s requirement that state judges be Democrats or Republicans

Adams v. Governor of Delaware–civil–partial reversal–Fuentes

UPDATE: the Third Circuit vacated this opinion on panel rehearing and issued a new one, link here.

The Delaware Constitution sets out a unique method for selecting state-court judges: the Governor appoints them (based on recommendations from nominating commissions, and without legislative involvement) subject to a requirement that the judges of each court contain a balance of Democrats and Republicans. For example, ” three of the five Justices of the Supreme Court in office at the same time, shall be of one major political party, and two of said Justices shall be of the other major political party.” The goal was to create a bipartisan state judiciary, but one effect was to exclude candidates who aren’t members of either of the two major parties.

A Delaware lawyer who is registered as an Independent challenged the political-affiliation requirement as a violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court denied his challenge, ruling that restricting judgeship eligibility based on political affiliation was allowed because judges qualify as policymakers. Today the Third Circuit reversed, holding that judicial officers, whether appointed or elected, are not policymakers. In so holding, the court split with the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. The court also rejected the governor’s argument that the state’s interest in political balance supports its requirement, holding that even if the interest qualifies as vital the rule is not narrowly tailored to meet it. The court also rejected the Governor’s challenge to standing.

Judge McKee concurred, joined (unusually) by both of the other judges on the panel, emphasizing that the Delaware judiciary is highly regarded and expressing confidence that the state can preserve its esteemed legal culture without the current political-affiliation requirement.

Joining Fuentes were McKee and Restrepo. Arguing counsel were David McBride of Young Conaway for the challenger and David Finger of Finger & Slanina for the governor.

Two new opinions

Roman v. City of Newark — civil rights — partial reversal — Ambro

A man was arrested for possession of illegal drugs, but the charges were dropped when the search ruled unlawful. The man then sued the officers and the city for violating his civil rights. The district court dismissed his claims, but today a divided Third Circuit majority reversed in part, holding that the man’s claims against the city based on a custom of unconstitutional searches and failure to train were adequately pled.

Joining Ambro was Jordan, who also authored a short concurrence. Hardiman dissented, faulting the majority for mentioning facts not alleged in the complaint and disagreeing with the majority as to the custom-of-searches (but not the failure-to-train) theory, and strenuously. Arguing counsel were Justin Santagata of Kaufman Semararo for the plaintiff and Wilson Antoine for the defendants.

 

Bedoya v. American Eagle Express — civil — affirmance — Shwartz

The Third Circuit rejected an employer’s argument that a federal statute pre-empted New Jersey law in defining employees and independent contractors, allowing a suit by delivery drivers alleging that the employer misclassified as contractors to proceed.

Joining Shwartz were Greenaway and Bibas. Arguing counsel were Harold Lichten for the plaintiffs, Joseph DiBlasio of Jackson Lewis for the employer, and Christopher Weber for New Jersey as amicus.

New opinions

US v. Wright — criminal — affirmance — Shwartz

Today, a fractured Third Circuit panel reversed a district court’s order dismissing a criminal indictment with prejudice after two trials and two hung juries. The lead opinion held that the district court lacked inherent authority to dismiss the indictment absent misconduct or “any prejudice beyond the general anxiety and inconvenience of facing a retrial.”

Judge McKee concurred in the judgment and Judge Nygaard dissented. Although both separate opinions refer to Judge Shwartz’s opinion as a majority opinion, at first blush I read Judge McKee’s rationale as narrower than Judge Shwartz’s so it is unclear to me which opinion will be viewed as binding precedent by future panels.

The case originally was decided yesterday without Judge McKee’s opinion.

Arguing counsel were Donovan Cocas of the WDPA US Attorney’s office for the government and Renee Pietropaolo of the WDPA federal defenders for the defendant.

Bryan v. US — civil rights — affirmance — Roth

After customs agents searched the cabins of three cruise-shop passengers, the passengers brought Bivens claims against the agents and the a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the government. Today, the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment against the passengers, holding that the Bivens claims were barred by qualified immunity and the FTCA claim by the discretionary-function exception.

Joining Roth were Krause and Fisher. Arguing counsel were David Nissman of McChain Nissman for the passengers and Samantha Chaifetz for the government.

New opinion — Third Circuit clarifies the new-evidence standard for proving actual innocence

Reeves v. Coleman — habeas corpus — reversal — Shwartz

[Disclosure: I represented the petitioner-appellant in this appeal, along with my superb pro bono co-counsel David Fine.]

Under habeas corpus law, petitioners who present new evidence of their actual innocence can have federal review of their procedurally barred or untimely constitutional claims if their innocence showing is strong enough. But what evidence qualifies as “new” evidence of innocence? Is innocence evidence “new” any time it was not presented at trial? What if it was available at trial, but counsel failed to discover or present it due to ineffective assistance of counsel?

Today the Third Circuit held that innocence evidence is new if it is the very evidence upon which the petitioner relies to demonstrate his counsel’s ineffective assistance, and that Reeves’s evidence meets that test, vacating the district court’s denial of relief based on the availability of the evidence at trial. The new-evidence standard announced today is more permissive than the various standards most district courts in the circuit have been applying, and today’s ruling is helpful for innocent prisoners fighting to get federal review of their claims.

Judge McKee concurred separately “to emphasize the weight of the evidence that supports Reeves’s claim of actual innocence,” noting that his showing is so substantial that a group of former federal judges and prosecutors filed an amicus brief on his behalf.

Joining Shwartz were McKee and Cowen, with McKee also concurring. Arguing counsel were yours truly for the petitioner and Ryan Lysaght of the Dauphin County D.A.’s office for the Commonwealth. Audio of the argument is here.

 

Update: the Court issued an amended opinion on July 23 that made minor, non-substantive edits to the footnotes in the concurrence. The link in the heading now goes to the amended opinion, the original opinion is here.

 

Three new opinions, including a major immigration appeal

S.E.R.L. v. AG — immigration — affirmance — Jordan

This appeal posed a fascinating tension: immigrant advocates urged the court not to apply Chevron deference. Broadly, conservatives today tend to oppose immigration and Chevron deference, while liberals tend to favor both. When the “liberal” side advances the “conservative” position, as here, the familiar ideological guideposts are harder to read.

The legal issue in today’s case was whether a Honduran woman and her children qualified for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act as members of a “particular social group.” Their group, they argued, consisted generally of family members of domestic-abuse victims. The Board of Immigration Appeals had interpreted “particular social group” narrowly, in a way fatal to the family’s claim here, and the family argued that its strict test wasn’t entitled to Chevron deference.  Today, the Third Circuit rejected their position, holding that the BIA’s interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference and denying the petition for review.

Joining avowed Chevron foe Jordan were Krause and Greenberg. Arguing counsel were Russell Falconer of Texas for the family and Sheri Glaser for the government. A footnote in the opinion thanked several groups for filing amicus briefs “which have assisted our consideration of the legal issues before us and also shine a light on an issue of international concern.”

Minarsky v. Susquehanna Co. — civil / employment discrimination — reversal — Rendell

A county secretary alleged that she was subjected to years of sexual harassment by a superior, the since-fired head of the county’s veterans-affairs department, and she sued various defendants including the county based on a theory vicarious liability. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county, but today the Third Circuit reversed, holding that whether the county had satisfied the Faragher-Elllerth affirmative defense to vicarious liabililty for workplace harassment should be decided by a jury.

Joining Rendell were Greenaway and Fuentes. Arguing counsel were David Koller of Koller Law for the secretary, Dana Zlotucha of Kreder Brooks Hailstone for the county, and Gerald Hanchulak for the superior.

Wayne Land & Mineral Gp. v. Delaware River Basin Comm’n — environmental — reversal — Jordan

The Third Circuit today reversed a district court’s dismissal of a suit brought by a company trying to keep the Delaware River Basin Commission from regulating its fracking work. The relevant law allows the commission to regulate a “project,” and the Third Circuit held that that term in ambiguous and remanded for fact-finding on the drafters’ intent.

Judge Scirica wrote a brief separate opinion. The signature line states simply that the opinion is “concurring,” and it ends with the statement that “I concur,” but the body of the opinion states that he agrees with part of the court’s opinion but has a concern that “precludes him from joining in full.” Specifically, he joined with the court’s ambiguity analysis but disagreed with the opinion’s inclusion of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of other issues that the district court will decide on remand.

(Readers may recall that is the case in which a lawyer fainted during the original oral argument.)

Joining Jordan were Hardiman and Scirica at least in part, and Scirica concurred. Arguing counsel were David Overstreet of Overstreet & Nestor for the appellant, Kenneth Warren of Warren Environmental Counsel for the commission, and Jordan Yeager of Curtin & Heefner for an intervenor group.

New opinion — Third Circuit rejects limit on attorney-fee recovery in IDEA suit

Rena C. v. Colonial School Dist. — civil / disability — reversal — Fisher

(I’m posting this later than usual because I had a moot today for my upcoming Third Circuit argument.)

The Third Circuit today ruled in favor of a plaintiff who prevailed in a suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in a dispute over attorney’s fees. The opinion’s introduction explains the context:

Under the IDEA, when parents and school districts dispute a child’s educational placement, a parent may file an administrative due process complaint that can lead to an administrative hearing. At least ten days before the dispute reaches a hearing, the school district can extend a settlement offer to the parent, referred to herein as a “ten-day offer.” If the matter proceeds to a hearing and the parent is the prevailing party, this ten-day offer becomes significant. A parent who is the prevailing party may be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees under the IDEA, but the ten-day offer allows a school district to limit its exposure to such fees by limiting a parent’s eligibility for attorney’s fees to only those fees accrued before the time of the ten-day offer. If a parent rejects the ten-day offer, the parent may only receive attorney’s fees for work done after the time of the offer if (1) the hearing leads to more favorable relief than the offer included, or (2) the parent was substantially justified in rejecting the offer.

Joining Fisher were Nygaard and Greenaway; Greenaway also concurred to express his hope that IDEA litigants will negotiate in good faith instead of simply rejecting “terse or inexact offers.” Arguing counsel were David Berney for the trial plaintiff and Karl Romberger of Sweet Stevens for the school district.

New opinion — Third Circuit affirms dismissal of in rem maritime suit

Liberty Woods Int’l v. The Motor Vessel Ocean Quartz — maritime — affirmance — Roth

The Third Circuit today upheld the dismissal of a shipping customer’s suit against a cargo ship, in rem, for damage to its cargo. The introduction explains:

Liability for the damage is governed by the carrier’s bill of lading, which contains a forum selection clause requiring suit to be brought in South Korea. LWI instead sought to bring an in rem suit against the Vessel in the District of New Jersey, arguing that the foreign forum selection clause violates the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) because South Korea does not allow in rem suits.

The court affirmed on the ground that the forum-selection clause doesn’t violate COGSA because in rem suits are not substantive rights under COGSA.

Joining Roth were McKee and Ambro; Ambro also concurred separately to note that in rem suits provide a way to impose liability and that COGSA requires that shippers have a means to collect damages against the value of the ship. Arguing counsel were Craig English of New York for the customer and Richard Whelan of Palmer Biezup for the ship.

 

Two new opinions: one PLRA, one TCPA

Paladino v. Newsome — prisoner civil rights — reversal in part — Fuentes

The Third Circuit today ruled in favor of a prisoner alleging he was the victim of excessive force, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for failure to exhaust the claim because there was a genuine issue of material fact on exhaustion. The district court ruled without notice to the parties, and the Third Circuit held that ” some type of notice and an opportunity to respond are needed before a district court elects to decide factual disputes regarding exhaustion.”

Joining Fuentes were Chagares and Vanaskie. Arguing counsel were Schnader Harrison associate Rachel Horton for the prisoner and Christopher Josephson for the state defendants.

 

City Select Auto Sales v. David Randall Assocs. — consumer — affirmance — Hardiman

A roofing company hired another company to send out tens of thousands of unsolicited advertisements by fax. One recipient sued the roofing company and its co-owner under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. He obtained a judgment against the roofing company for over $22 million, which sounds about right to me. The suit against the co-owner personally went to trial, the plaintiff lost, and he appealed. Today, the Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the jury instructions and a response to a jury question.

Joining Hardiman were Vanaskie and Shwartz; Shwartz also concurred separately to disagree with dicta in the main opinion questioning whether a corporate officer can be personally liable under the TCPA. Arguing counsel were Daniel Cohen of Chicago for the trial plaintiff and Emmett Fitzpatrick III of Flamm Walton for the reviled fax-ad senders.

Two new opinions, including a big qualified-immunity reversal

Kedra v. Schroeter — civil rights — reversal — Krause

A Pennsylvania state trooper died during a routine firearms training when the instructor allegedly failed to check whether a gun was empty before pointing it at the trooper’s chest and pulling the trigger. The slain trooper’s wife sued the instructor under 42 USC § 1983, alleging a due process state-created-danger claim. The district court ruled that the instructor was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not know that the gun was loaded. Today, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the obviousness of a risk is relevant to prove that the state actor was aware of that risk and that here the wife sufficiently alleged the instructor’s awareness.

Judge Fisher concurred, although in my view it would have been more accurate to say he concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He argued, among other points, that the majority’s reliance on the obviousness of the risk and the officer’s training was mistaken. He wrote:

I am concerned by the impact that the breadth of the majority’s decision could have on the law of qualified immunity. I am equally troubled by the recent trajectory of this Court’s jurisprudence.

Fisher closed by noting, “Perhaps the full Court will revisit the qualified immunity framework to reexamine whether it is consistent with the history of the Due Process Clause.” (Judge Fisher assumed senior status on February 1, and senior judges do not vote on whether to grant en banc rehearing.)

Joining Krause was Melloy CA8 by designation; Fisher concurred. Arguing counsel were Michael Quirk of Williams Cuker for the wife and Claudia Tesoro of the state AG’s office for the instructor.

 

US v. Ferguson — criminal — affirmance — Hardiman

The Third Circuit held that the district court did not commit plain error when it mentioned a defendant’s bare arrests at sentencing, distinguishing Mateo-Medina.

Joining Hardiman were Jordan and Scirica. The case was decided without oral argument.

4 new opinions, including two immigration reversals

Uddin v. AG — immigration — reversal — Rendell

The Third Circuit today granted an immigration petition to review, holding that the BIA erred when it found a Bangladesh citizen ineligible for withholding of removal. The BIA had deemed him ineligible because he was a member of a major political party, some of whose members had committed terrorist acts.

The Third Circuit held that membership in a party whose members had committed terrorism wasn’t enough — the BIA had to find that the terrorist acts were authorized by party leaders. Analogizing to American politics, the court observed, “If a single member of the Democratic or Republican Party committed a terrorist act, we would not impute terrorist status to the entire group, absent some showing that party leadership authorized the act.”

The court joined the reasoning of a 2008 Seventh Circuit opinion authored by just-retired Judge Posner. Not surprisingly, today’s opinion quotes Posner at length and identifies him by name.

Joining Rendell were Greenaway and Shwartz; Greenaway also concurred separately. Arguing counsel were Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran of NY for the petitioner and Daniel Smulow for the government.

UPDATE: The Court issued an amended opinion on September 25. The opinion link has been updated; the change is identified in this order.

 

Mateo v. AG — immigration — reversal — Vanaskie

The Third Circuit held that a non-citizen’s Pennsylvania conviction for robbery of a motor vehicle did not support his removal. The removal order was premised on the vehicle-robbery conviction being a crime of violence, but the Third Circuit held that the crime-of-violence standard was unconstitutionally vague. The court joined three other circuits on this point, splitting with the Fifth Circuit. The court further held that the vagueness standard is no lower in immigration cases than it is in criminal cases.

Joining Vanaskie were McKee and Jordan. Arguing counsel were Tracey Hubbard of Scranton for the petitioner and Matthew Connelly for the government.

 

US v. Hodge — criminal — reversal in part — Chagares

After a Virgin Islands man used a gun to rob an armored vehicle, the government charged him with a separate Virgin Islands gun count for each of three crimes he committed during the offense. Today, the Third Circuit vacated two of those non-federal convictions on double jeopardy grounds (but it rejected the analogous argument as to two federal gun counts). The court granted relief even though the defendant received a single sentence for all three counts, similar to the federal practice of imposing concurrent sentences. The court rejected the defendant’s many other challenges.

Joining Chagares were Jordan and Hardiman. Arguing counsel were Richard Della Fera of Florida for the defendant and David White for the government.

 

Moody v. Atlantic City Bd. of Education — employment discrimination — reversal — Shwartz

An employee sued her employer, alleging that a fellow employee had sexually harassed her and the employer retaliated against her when she complained.

On the harassment claim, the employer’s liability turned on whether the alleged harasser was her supervisor even though he didn’t hire and couldn’t fire her. The plaintiff was a substitute janitor who worked at different sites; the alleged harasser had the power to decide if she got work at one of those sites, and in a recent several-month period 70% of her work had been at that site. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer based its conclusion that the alleged harasser was not her supervisor.

Today, a divided Third Circuit panel reversed, holding that the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to survive summary judgment on whether the alleged harasser was her supevisor. Judge Rendell dissented on this point, arguing that in light of a recent Supreme Court case the majority was “simply incorrect.”

On the retaliation claim, the panel was unanimous that reversal was required, holding that her allegation that her hours were reduced right after she complained was sufficient.

Joining Shwartz was Greenaway; Rendell dissented in part. Arguing counsel were Samuel Dion of Dion & Goldberger for the plaintiff and Rachel Conte of Riley and Rile for the employer.

4 new opinions

I’m out of the office for the next few days, so my posts will be later and briefer than usual.

McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power — civil — affirmance — Smith

The Third Circuit today upheld summary judgment in favor of the defense in a major civil suit that alleged that radiation emissions caused the plaintiffs’ cancers.

Smith was joined by Restrepo. McKee concurred (apparently without joining Smith’s opinion, and also joined by Restrepo, which seems likely to cause future confusion to the extent the two opinions disagree). Arguing counsel were Louis Bograd of Motley Rice for the plaintiffs and John Phillips of Paul Hastings and Nancy Milburn of Arnold & Porter for the defendants.

 

Mendoza-Ordonez v. AG — immigration — reversal — Nygaard

The Third Circuit granted a Honduras citizen’s petition for review, holding that the man was entitled to withholding of removal based on evidence that he faced violence for his political views and reports indicating that his home country was unable to protect him.

Joining Nygaard were Ambro and Restrepo. Arguing counsel were Joseph Brophy of Brophy & Lenahan for the petitioner and Sabatino Leo for the government.

 

Williams v. Globus Medical — civil — affirmance — Scirica

The Third Circuit upheld dismissal of a shareholder suit against a company for belatedly disclosing a business decision that caused a sales decline.

Joining Scirica were Chagares and Fisher. Arguing counsel were Jacob Goldberg of the Rosen Law Firm for the shareholders and Barry Kaplan of WA for the company.

 

Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. US Army Corp of Engineers — environmental — affirmance — Smith

The Third Circuit denied a petition to review an agency ruling approving a gas pipeline.

Joining Smith were Nygaard and Fuentes. Arguing counsel were Aaron Stemplewicz for the Riverkeepers, Varu Chilakamurri for the government, and John Stoviak of Saul Ewing for the intervenor pipeline company.

New opinion — ascertainability, again [updated]

City Select Auto Sales v. BMW Bank — class action — reversal — Scirica

If you were to make a list of the most significant things the Third Circuit has done in recent years — or the most controversial — you’d probably include its creation of the “ascertainability” requirement for class certification. The ascertainability requirement obligates plaintiffs seek to proceed with certain class actions to show that the class is objectively defined and that there’s a “reliable and administratively feasible” way to figure out who’s in the class. Since creating the requirement in 2012, the court has issued several major opinions refining it, while Judge Rendell has called for abandoning it.

Today the Third Circuit revisited the ascertainability issue again, vacating a district court’s ruling that relied on it to deny class certification. The court explained:

In this case, we will vacate and remand for two reasons. First, our ascertainability precedents do not categorically preclude affidavits from potential class members, in combination with the Creditsmarts database, from satisfying the ascertainability standard. Second, because the Creditsmarts database was not produced during discovery, plaintiff was denied the opportunity to demonstrate whether a reliable, administratively feasible method of ascertaining the class exists based, in whole or in part, on that database.

Joining Scirica were Krause and Fuentes. Fuentes also concurred to join Rendell’s earlier call to reject the ascertainability requirement, noting that three circuits have rejected it and arguing that it creates an unnecessary burden for low-value consumer class actions.

Arguing counsel were Philip Bock of Chicago for the putative-class plaintiff, Julia Strickland of Los Angeles for 2 defendants, and William Hayes III of Denver for a third defendant.

UPDATE: Alison Frankel of Reuters has this outstanding analysis of today’s case and what it means for the larger battle over ascertainability.

New opinions — catching up on last week’s ten opinions, including another ACA blockbuster and several notable reversals

Last week I was on vacation. During slow periods it’s not all that rare for the Third Circuit to go a week without issuing a single published opinion. But July/August is never a slow period — that’s when clerkships typically end, so everyone is scrambling to clear the decks. Last week the court issued 10 precedential opinions, 5 on Friday alone.

And there were some big ones, including a hot-button Affordable Care Act case and reversals in criminal, habeas, immigration, and prisoner civil rights cases. But enough wind-up …

 

US v. Wrensford [July 31] — criminal — reversal in part — Shwartz

The Third Circuit held that a defendant was arrested for Fourth Amendment purposes when he was involuntarily taken to a police station and held in a cell. Seems obvious, but the district court ruled to the contrary. The court vacated his criminal conviction and remanded. The court affirmed a co-defendant’s convictions on various grounds.

Joining Shwartz were Greenaway and Fuentes. Arguing counsel were FPD Omodare Jupiter for the prevailing appellant, Martial Webster for the other appellant, and Rhonda Williams-Henry and David White for the government.

 

Haskell v. Superintendent [August 1] — habeas corpus — reversal — Ambro

In this significant habeas corpus opinion, the Third Circuit held that a petitioner who has established a reasonable likelihood that the prosecution’s knowing use of false evidence could have affected the outcome need not also show that the error was not harmless. (Or, for my fellow habeas nerds, once you clear Napue you don’t have to clear Brecht too.) On the merits, the court reversed the district court’s denial of relief. Appallingly, the district court had not even granted a certificate of appealability.

Joining Ambro were Vanaskie and Restrepo. Arguing counsel were AFPD Elisa Long for the appellant and Mark Richmond of the Erie DA’s office for the Commonwealth.

 

EEOC v. City of Long Branch [August 2] — civil procedure — reversal — Chagares

The Third Circuit summarized its decision vacating a district court ruling in an EEOC enforcement suit thus:

The EEOC raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether Long Branch is precluded from contesting the motion to enforce because it failed to exhaust its administrative remedies ***, and (2) whether the EEOC may disclose information from the noncharging parties’ employment and personnel records to Lt. Johnson ***. Despite the compelling nature of these issues, we will not reach them because of a procedural error committed by the District Court: the District Court erroneously treated the motion to enforce that the Magistrate Judge had reviewed as a nondispositive motion instead of a dispositive motion. This is a meaningful distinction under the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 631, et seq., as the categorization of motion dictates, inter alia, the level of authority with which a magistrate judge may act on a motion and the availability and standard of review afforded by the District Court and our Court.

Joining Chagares were Ambro and Fuentes. The case was decided without oral argument.

 

Ildefonso-Candelario v. AG [August 3] — immigration — reversal — Stearns

The Third Circuit held that a conviction under Pennsylvania’s obstruction-of-justice statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 5101, is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because it sweeps in non-fraudulent conduct. The court firmly rejected the government’s request to remand without decision to let the BIA reconsider its ruling.

Joining Stearns (D. Mass., sitting by designation) were Jordan and Krause. Arguing counsel were Daniel Conklin of the Shagin Law Group for the petitioner and Rebecca Phillips for the government.

 

Blackledge v. Blackledge [August 3] — family — affirmance — Krause

The Third Circuit rejected a father’s appeal from denial of his petition alleging that the mother violated an international treaty by retaining custody of their son.

Joining Krause were Ambro and Nygaard. Arguing counsel for the father was former Fisher clerk M. Patrick Yingling of Reed Smith; Barbara Ernsberger of Behrend & Ernsberger argued for the mother. The opinion thanked the father’s counsel for accepting the court’s appointment in the case and for their “excellent briefing and argument.”

 

Millhouse v. Heath [August 4] — prisoner civil rights — reversal — Cowen

The mean-spirited Prison Litigation Reform Act contains a provision — the PLRA’s three strikes rule — that poor prisoners cannot qualify for the same reduced filing fees as any other poor litigants if they previously filed three or more prisoner suits that were deemed frivolous, because it’s so fair to punish people who are poor and lawyer-less for not accurately assessing the strength of their potential legal claims.

Last week, a partially divided Third Circuit panel held that a prisoner was entitled to file in forma pauperis despite having more than 3 prior suits dismissed as frivolous because (1) the number of PLRA strikes must be assessed as of the time the notice of appeal is filed and (2) dismissals without prejudice for failure to state a claim do not count as strikes. Judge Ambro disagreed on both points but would have reached the same result through equitable tolling.

Joining Cowen was Restrepo, with Ambro dissenting in part. Arguing counsel were Stephen Fogdall of Schnader Harrison for the prisoner and Timothy Judge for the government. The opinion thanked Fogdall and his Schnader co-counsel Emily Hanlon for their “excellent work” as pro bono counsel appointed by the court.

 

US v. Ferriero [August 4] — criminal — affirmance — Scirica

The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence of a New Jersey county politico convicted of violating the Travel Act, RICO, and the wire fraud statute by lobbying on behalf of commercial clients without disclosing his own financial interest. In a lengthy opinion, the court rejected various challenges to the convictions, including the defendant’s quite plausible-sounding argument that failing to disclose his interest cannot constitute making a false or fraudulent misrepresentation under the wire fraud statute. The court also rejected the defendant’s arguments relying on McDonnell v. United States.

Joining Scirica were Hardiman and Rosenthal SD Tex by designation. Arguing counsel were Peter Goldberger for the defendant and Bruce Keller for the government.

 

US v. Chapman [August 4] — criminal — affirmance — Greenaway

The Third Circuit held that a conviction for mailing a threat to injure constitutes a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. Judge Jordan concurred “to express dismay at the ever-expanding application of the categorical approach.”

Joining Greenaway were Jordan and Rendell. Arguing counsel were Ronald Krauss of the MDPA federal defender for the defendant and unfairly blocked Third Circuit nominee Rebecca Ross Haywood for the government.

 

In re: AE Liquidation [August 4] — civil — affirmance — Krause

The opinion’s introduction says it best:

This case arises from the bankruptcy and subsequent
closing of a jet aircraft manufacturer, and requires us to assess
that manufacturer’s obligation under the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
2101-2109, to give fair warning to its employees before
effecting a mass layoff. On appeal, we are asked to determine
whether a business must notify its employees of a pending
layoff once the layoff becomes probable—that is, more likely
than not—or if the mere foreseeable possibility that a layoff
may occur is enough to trigger the WARN Act’s notice
requirements. Because we conclude that a probability of
layoffs is necessary, and the manufacturer has demonstrated
that its closing was not probable until the day that it occurred,
it cannot be held liable for its failure to give its employees
requisite notice. Accordingly, we will affirm ***

Joining Krause were Fisher and Greenberg. Arguing counsel were Jack Raisner of New York for the appellants and Barry Klayman of Cozen O’Connor for the appellees.

 

Real Alternatives v. Secretary DHHS [August 4] — civil — affirmance — Rendell

A sharply split Third Circuit panel held last week that a secular anti-abortion group with no religious affiliation was not entitled to the same exemption as houses of worship from the Affordable Care Act’s requirement that employer-provided health insurance include contraceptive services. The court also held that employees’ religious beliefs are not substantially burdened by the ACA’s contraception mandate. The majority answered both questions “[a]fter careful review, but without any hesitation.” A petition for certiorari seems a certainty and I sure wouldn’t bet against a grant.

Joining Rendell was Greenaway. Jordan dissented as to the rejection of the employees’ claims. Both authors are at the top of their game. Arguing counsel were Matthew Bowman of Alliance Defending Freedom for the employer and employees and Joshua Salzman for the government.

New opinions — an immigration win and two criminal-appeal affirmances

Rodriguez v. AG — immigration — petition granted — Shwartz

The Third Circuit today granted a Domincan Republic citizen’s petition for review because the conviction that triggered his removal proceedings had been vacated and the notice of removal did not say that his placement in a deferred adjudication program supported removal.

Shwartz was joined by Ambro and Fuentes. The case was decided without argument; winning counsel was Fabian Lima.

 

US v. Robinson — criminal — partial affirmance — Roth

A divided Third Circuit panel today affirmed a criminal conviction but remanded, after the government’s concession of error and with no analysis, for a re-determination of whether the defendant is a career offender. The key issue on appeal was whether a defendant who uses a gun during a Hobbs Act robbery commits a “crime of violence” per 18 USC 924(c). The court held that the gun-use crime qualifies as a crime of violence when the defendant is tried and convicted together of both gun use and robbery.

Roth was joined by McKee; Fuentes concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Arguing counsel were Brett Sweitzer of the EDPA federal defender for the defendant and Bernadette McKeon for the government.

 

US v. Galati — criminal — affirmance — Roth

A similar panel affirmed another criminal conviction against a similar challenge brought by the same counsel. The panel expressly followed the Robinson decision described above and described this case as bearing a striking resemblance.

Joining Roth were McKee and Jordan. Arguing counsel were Brett Sweitzer for the defendant and Mark Coyne for the government.

 

En banc court upholds habeas relief in capital case, plus two divided panels and a sentencing affirmance

Another blockbuster August day today, with a big capital-habeas en banc ruling and three panel opinions. Over 300 pages of opinion today.

Dennis v. Secretary — capital habeas corpus — affirmance — Rendell

The en banc Third Circuit today affirmed habeas corpus relief for James Dennis, holding in a landmark habeas opinion that the prosecution suppressed evidence that effectively gutted its case and that the Pa. Supreme Court unreasonably applied Brady v. Maryland when it denied relief. The 2015 panel ruling (Fisher with Smith and Chagares) had ruled for the state.

Joining Rendell were McKee, Ambro, Fuentes, Greenaway, Vanaskie, Shwartz, and Krause, and by Jordan in part. McKee concurred “to underscore the problems inherent in eyewitness testimony and the inadequacies of our standard jury instructions relating to that evidence.” Jordan concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, noting:

Every judge of our en banc Court has now concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s contrary determination was not only wrong, but so obviously wrong that it cannot pass muster even under AEDPA’s highly-deferential standard of review. In other words, it is the unanimous view of this Court that any fairminded jurist must disagree with the Dennis I court’s assessment of the materiality and favorability of the Cason receipt. Yet somehow a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court endorsed Dennis’s conviction and death sentence. The lack of analytical rigor and attention to detail in that decision on direct appeal is all the more painful to contemplate because the proof against Dennis is far from overwhelming. He may be innocent.

Fisher dissented, joined by Smith, Chagares, and Hardiman, and Hardiman also authored a dissent that Smith and Fisher joined. Arguing counsel were Amy Rohe of Reisman Karron for Dennis and Ronald Eisenberg of the Philadelphia D.A.’s office for the state.

 

Watson v. Rozum — prisoner civil rights — reversal in part — McKee

A divided Third Circuit panel today ruled in favor of a prisoner alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim.

Joining McKee was Ambro; Ambro also concurred, explaining the court’s rejection of caselaw from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits and its disavowal of prior non-precedential circuit rulings. Hardiman dissented. Arguing counsel were Kemal Mericli of the Pa. A.G.’s office for the state and former Fisher clerk Ellen Mossman of Dechert for the prisoner.

 

NAACP v. City of Philadelphia — First Amendment — affirmance — Ambro

It’s unusual enough for the same panel to issue two precedential opinions on the same day, but it’s rare indeed for the same judge to dissent in both cases. But so it was here, where Hardiman again dissented from a McKee-Ambro majority. In this case, the majority affirmed a district court ruling that Philadelphia’s policy of banning non-commercial advertising at its airport violates the First Amendment.

Arguing counsel were Craig Gottlieb for the city and Fred Magaziner of Dechert (who clerked for Rosenn) for the challengers.

 

US v. Carter — criminal — affirmance — Shwartz

The Third Circuit affirmed a district court criminal sentence applying a sentencing enhancement for maintaining a stash house. The defendant had argued he did not maintain the stash house because he did not own or rent the house and did not pay for its operation from his own funds.

Joining Shwartz were Fuentes and Restrepo. The case was decided without oral argument.

Three new opinions, featuring two judges writing separately on substantial standing and waiver issues

Freedom From Religion Foundation v. New Kensington Arnold S.D. — civil / First Amendment —  reversal in part — Shwartz

For the past 60 years, a public high school in Pennsylvania has a had a granite monument on school grounds inscribed with the Ten Commandments. A student, a parent, and a group dedicated to the separation of church and state sued the school, alleging that the monument violated the Establishment Clause, but the district court dismissed the suit on standing and mootness grounds. Today, the Third Circuit reversed in part, holding that the parent had standing because she had direct contact with the monument and remanding to determine whether the parent was a member of the group.

Joining Shwartz were Smith and Hardiman; Smith concurred dubitante in a lengthy opinion explaining his doubt that a claim for nominal damages should suffice to confer standing or overcome mootness.

Arguing counsel were Marcus Schneider of Steele Schneider for the appellants, Anthony Sanchez for the school district, and Mayer Brown associate Charles Woodworth for amicus.

 

NLRB v. Fedex Freight — labor — petition denied — Scirica

A group of Fedex Freight drivers voted to unionize but Fedex refused to bargain with them, arguing that another group of employees had to be included, too. The NLRB ruled against Fedex and Fedex filed a petition for review. Today, a divided Third Circuit panel denied the petition for review. Apart from the merits issues, the majority and concurring opinions feature an important back-and-forth about when cursory presentation of an argument in district court will result in waiver on appeal.

Joining Scirica was Ambro; Jordan concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, explaining his view that Fedex waived one of its central arguments below by making it only in passing in a footnote. Arguing counsel were Milakshmi Rajapakse for the NLRB and Ivan Rich Jr. for Fedex.

 

US v. Stevenson — criminal — affirmance — Hardiman

The Third Circuit today affirmed a criminal defendant’s conviction and sentence, rejecting a series of challenges including his argument that the dismissal of the charges against him for a speedy-trial violation should have been with prejudice, not without. The court also held that indictment defects are subject to harmless error analysis, overruling its own prior precedent based on intervening Supreme Court precedent and splitting with the Ninth Circuit.

Joining Hardiman were Smith and Shwartz. The case was decided without argument.

New opinions — an en banc ruling in the Double Eagle gold coins case, plus an immigration case

Langbord v. US Dept. of the Treasury — civil — affirmance — Hardiman

The en banc Third Circuit ruled that the government was allowed to keep 10 extremely rare and valuable Double Eagle gold coins it seized from the family that had handed them over for authentication. Previously a divided panel (Rendell and McKee with Sloviter dissenting) had ruled for the family. It’s an unusual en banc case in that covers a dizzying list of appellate issues, many of them fact-bound.

The court split 8+1 to 3. Joining Hardiman were Ambro, Fuentes, Smith, Fisher, Chagares, Vanaskie, and Shwartz. Jordan concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, describing the Mint’s strategy of claiming the coins without judicial authorization as “a bad idea.” Rendell with McKee and Krause dissented, criticizing the majority’s reasoning as “at best cryptic and, at worst, sets an incorrect and dangerous precedent that would allow the Government to nullify CAFRA’s provisions at will.”

Arguing counsel were Barry Berke for the family and Robert Zauzmer for the government.

An interesting and odd case.

 

Sunday v. AG — immigration — petition denied — Chagares

The Third Circuit held that the Immigration and Nationality Act does not grant the Attorney General authority to grant a waiver of inadmissibility, and it held that removal cannot be unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment because it is not punishment.

Joining Chagares were Fisher and Barry. Arguing counsel were Keith Whitson of Schnader Harrison in Pittsburgh for the petitioner and Andrew Oliveira for the government.

Divided panel issues significant abortion-clinic-access ruling

Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh — First Amendment — vacate in part — Jordan

The overwhelming majority of circuit court decisions are uncontroversial and essentially non-ideological. This ain’t one of them.

The Third Circuit today vacated an order dismissing First Amendment challenge to Pittsburgh’s ordinance prohibiting certain speech within fifteen feet of health care facilities. The suit was brought by five plaintiffs who “engage in what they call ‘sidewalk counseling’ on the public sidewalk outside of a Pittsburgh Planned Parenthood facility in an effort, through close conversation, to persuade women to forego abortion services.”

The blockbuster language from Jordan’s opinion:

Considered in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the First Amendment claims are sufficient to go forward at this stage of the litigation. The speech at issue is core political speech entitled to the maximum protection afforded by the First Amendment, and the City cannot burden it without first trying, or at least demonstrating that it has seriously considered, substantially less restrictive alternatives that would achieve the City’s legitimate, substantial, and content-neutral interests. McCullen teaches that the constitutionality of buffer zone laws turns on the factual circumstances giving rise to the law in each individual case – the same type of buffer zone may be upheld on one record where it might be struck down on another. Hence, dismissal of claims challenging ordinances like the one at issue here will rarely, if ever, be appropriate at the pleading stage. Instead, factual development will likely be indispensable to the assessment of whether an ordinance is constitutionally permissible.

Fuentes disagreed:

I agree with the majority that the allegations in the Complaint, taken as true, establish that Pittsburgh’s Ordinance restricting certain speech within 15 feet of designated health care facilities violates the intermediate-scrutiny standard for time, place, and manner regulations. I disagree, however, with the majority’s reasoning in support of that result. In particular, I disagree with its conclusion that the Supreme Court’s decision in McCullen v. Coakley requires governments that place “significant” burdens on speech to prove either that less speech-restrictive measures have failed or that alternative measures were “seriously” considered and “reasonably” rejected. That interpretation distorts narrow-tailoring doctrine by eliminating the government’s latitude to adopt regulations that are not “the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the government’s interests.” Nothing in McCullen or the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence requires us to apply such a rule. Accordingly, as to Plaintiffs’ free-speech claim, I concur only in the judgment.

In an especially strongly worded footnote, the majority fired back (emphasis mine):

The concurrence repeatedly tries to downplay the significance of McCullen – variously referring to the opinion as “incremental,” “modest,” and “unexceptional” (Concurrence at 4-5) – and devotes much of its energy to narrowing that case only to its facts. It does so, presumably, in service of a desire to avoid the import of the Supreme Court’s decision. Consider our colleague’s reading of McCullen: “[u]nlike the majority, I do not believe that McCullen announces a general rule requiring the government to affirmatively prove that less-restrictive measures would fail to achieve its interests.” (Concurrence at 1-2.) Then try to reconcile that with the actual language of McCullen: “To meet the requirement of narrow tailoring, the government must demonstrate that alternative measures that burden substantially less speech would fail to achieve the government’s interests, not simply that the chosen route is easier.” 134 S. Ct. at 2540. We are more ready than our colleague is to take the high Court at its word, and that is the heart of our disagreement with him.

I’d certainly expect a petition for en banc rehearing here. I’m not making any prediction about whether it would be granted, but I expect it would get a very careful look.

Joining Jordan was Vanaskie; Fuentes joined in part and concurred in the judgment on the First Amendment issue. Arguing counsel were Matthew Bowman (a CA3 Alito clerk) of the Alliance Defending Freedom for the challengers and Matthew McHale for the city.